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Solving The Feres Puzzle: A Proposed
Analytical Framework For "Incident
To Service"
A familiar common-law doctrine is that the sovereign cannot be
sued without consent.' The doctrine of sovereign immunity evolved
from a concern that the governmental means required for the proper
administration of public service would be endangered if the supreme
authority could be subjected to suit by the citizens. 2 The doctrine of
sovereign immunity survived the Revolutionary War because of the
financial instability of the newly created United States, rather than
American acceptance of the theoretical foundation of the doctrine.3
The traditional immunity from suit enjoyed by the United States,
however, was partially waived by Congress through the enactment
of the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 (hereinafter referred to as
FTCA).4
The FTCA grants federal district courts jurisdiction over claims
against the United States for injuries negligently caused by govern-
ment employees5 acting within the scope of their employment,' under
circumstances in which the United States, if a private citizen, would
be liable under the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.7 The FTCA specifically includes members of the military
within the definition of "government employees." ' The FTCA,
however, exempts the United States from liability on any claim aris-
ing out of military combatant activities during time of war.9 A logical
conclusion, therefore, is that the FTCA is sufficiently broad to allow
1. See The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 153-54 (1868).
2. Id. at 154.
3. Gellhorn and Schenk, Tort Actions Against the Federal Government, 47 COLUM. L.
REv. 722, 722 (1927). A persuasive argument for the proposition that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity never should have been adopted by American courts is contained in Borchard, Govern-
mental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1039, 1039 (1926). But see The Siren, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 152, 153-54 (1868).
4. 28 U.S.C. §§1346, 2671-2680. See generally Suits on Tort Claims Against the United
States, 7 F.R.D. 689, 689-91 (1948) (pre-FrCA federal legislative history).
5. 28 U.S.C. §2671 (definition of government employee).
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a tort action by service members against the United States in some
situations.
The United States Supreme Court addressed the question whether
the FTCA extends a remedy to service members in Feres v. United
States." The Court held that injuries sustained by service members
are actionable under the FTCA unless sustained incident to service,"
reaffirming the holding of Brooks v. United States.12 In Feres, the
Court was concerned with injuries sustained by three service members
"incident to the service."' 13 The Court stated that although when read
literally, the FTCA allows tort actions against the United States for
injuries suffered by military members, Congress did not intend to sub-
ject the government to claims for injuries sustained incident to service."
The Court based the denial of a remedy on the two critical policy
considerations of the need to maintain the unique relationship be-
tween military members and to obviate any adverse effects upon military
discipline.15 Moreover, the Court invited Congress to enact contrary
legislation if the interpretation of the FTCA by the Court was
incorrect.' 6 Congress has not accepted that invitation.
Although the Feres doctrine has been controversial since its incep-
tion over thirty years ago,' 7 the United States Supreme Court has
reaffirmed the doctrine twice in the past seven years. In Stencel Aero
Engineering Corp. v. United States," the Court held that the right
of a third party to recover in an indemnity action against the United
States' 9 is limited by the rationale of Feres when the injured party
is a military member. 20 The Supreme Court also recently reaffirmed
the doctrine as applied to active duty service members for the first
time since Feres in Chappell v. Wallace.2' In Chappell, the Court stated
that "[c]ivilian courts must, at the very least, hesitate long before
10. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
11. Id. at 146.
12. 337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949).
13. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950).
14. Id. at 140-43.
15. Id. at 141-44.
16. Id. at 138.
17. See, e.g., Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1251 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 2234 (1982) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (udicial criticism of Feres); Note, From Feres
to Stencel: Should Military Have Access to FTCA Recovery?, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1099, 1118-26
(1979) (criticism of Feres doctrine).
18. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
19. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 554-55 (1951).
20. Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 669-74 (1977).
21. 103 S. Ct. 2362 (1983).
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entertaining a suit which asks the court to tamper with the estab-
lished relationship between [military members]."22
At first glance, the Feres doctrine may seem a deterrent to FTCA
claims by service members, but FTCA claims by service members have
not decreased.23 The Court specifically noted that the plaintiffs in
Feres and Chappell were on active duty and not on leave, 4 thereby
appearing to condone suits by service members who are injured while
on leave or off duty. Plaintiffs have relied upon this interpretation
and have continued to file FTCA claims, attempting to distinguish
their cases from Feres, and now Chappell. Moreover, plaintiffs do
not have consistent stare decisis from which they can predict the
cognizability of their claims. The Court has not furnished specific
guidelines to determine whether a plaintiff's injuries were sustained
"incident to service" when the negligent act occurs during the plain-
tiff's leave or off-duty hours. Lower courts have been inconsistent
in determining if the FTCA claims of active-duty military members
are cognizable because of the absence of an analytical framework for
"incident to service." Unless district courts are consistent in deter-
mining whether they have jurisdiction over FTCA claims of service
members, plaintiffs will be uncertain in determining if they qualify
to sue the government.
This comment will examine the right of active-duty military members
to sue the government under the FTCA. Causes of action by service
members who have been discharged or retired will not be addressed.
2 6
Initial focus will be on the development of the Feres doctrine,27 with
particular emphasis on the policy reasons underlying the Supreme Court
interpretation of the FTCA. 21 The three primary factors considered
by courts in determining if the plaintiffs injuries were sustained inci-
dent to service then will be examined.2 9 This examination will reveal
that inconsistent court decisions have resulted from the indifferent
application of these factors by lower courts. Available remedies other
than the FTCA then will be examined to determine why injured ser-
vice members seek judicial relief.30 Courts have recognized that
22. Id. at 2365.
23. See Note, supra note 17, at 1099.
24. See Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362, 2367 (1983).
25. See Rhodes, The Feres Doctrine After Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F. L. Ray. 24, 41 (1976).
26. See generally Comment, Judicial Recovery for the Post-Service Tort: A Veteran's Last
Battle, 14 PAC. L.J. 333 (1983).
27. See infra notes 33-77 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 82-115 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 119-38 and accompanying text.
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although veterans benefits are available, government liability in FTCA
lawsuits may be greater than the veterans benefits that the injured
military members will receive."
This comment will suggest that the courts apply a three factor
analysis to determine if military members' FTCA lawsuits should be
barred based upon the plaintiffs' injuries having been sustained "in-
cident to service." '3 2 Each factor will be analyzed in the context of
two hypothetical fact situations. This author will conclude that since
the Feres doctrine does not appear to be subject to judicial abandon-
ment or legislative revision, the courts should adopt a uniform
analytical framework to determine if a plaintiff's injuries were sus-
tained incident to service. Judicial application of a consistent analytical
framework will allow plaintiffs to predict the viability of their claims,
thereby eventually decreasing the number of FTCA lawsuits filed by
military members. To provide a clear understanding of the right of
military members to sue under the FTCA, an initial discussion of
the Feres doctrine is necessary.
Tim Feres DOCTRINE: INTERPRETATION OF THE FTCA FOR
MILITARY MEMBERS
While the British political theory that the King could do no wrong
was repudiated in the United States,i jhe legal doctrine that the Crown
was immune from any suit to which it had not consented was ap-
plied by our courts as vigorously as the doctrine had been on behalf
of the Crown." The Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 terminated the
controversial34 sovereign immunity of the United States government."
As an integral part of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,
the FTCA had two primary purposes: (1) removing the previous bar-
rier to tort suits against the government, and (2) relieving Congress
of the burden of handling thousands of private bills for relief sub-
mitted each year because of the absence of any other remedy.3 6
The FTCA holds the United States liable for tort claims "in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
31. See Rhodes, supra note 25, at 41 n.170 (comparison of veterans benefits with probable
verdicts for service members' FTCA lawsuits).
32. See infra notes 138-78 and accompanying text.
33. Feres, 340 U.S. at 139.
34. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
35. See 28 U.S.C. §1346.
36. See H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. (1946); SEN. REP. No. 1400, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1946); see also Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1009 (5th Cir. 1980).
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like circumstances."" The FTCA thus expressly ties the liability of
the United States to the state laws governing the place where the alleged
negligent act or omission occurred, subjecting the FTCA lawsuit to
the statutory limitations of the state on awards and other related mat-
ters. The FTCA, however, exempts the United States from liability
for interest prior to judgment and for punitive damages. 8 Federal
district courts have exclusive jurisdiction of FTCA lawsuits. 39 Moreover,
an FTCA lawsuit is tried by the court without a jury.4" Prerequisite
to the ability to sue in district court, claimants must present their
claims to the appropriate federal agency and (1) be denied relief by
the agency, or (2) not receive final disposition of the claim within
six months after filing. 4' The FTCA also lists thirteen exclusions, 2
including claims arising out of military combatant activities. 3 The
Suipreme Court interpretation of the FTCA produced the Feres doc-
trine, which has been the focus of controversy and continuous
challenge." To provide a clear understanding of the Feres doctrine,
a discussion of the initial examination by the United States Supreme
Court of the FTCA in Brooks v. United States is necessary.
A. Brooks v. United States: The Bridge to Feres
Brooks v. United States" was the first case heard by the United
States Supreme Court concerning the issue of service members' right
to sue the government under the FTCA. The Court framed the issue
as "whether members of the United States armed forces can recover
under [the FTCA] for injuries not incident to service."" (Emphasis
added.) In Brooks, two brothers, on leave from active-duty military
service, and their father were driving on a public highway when a
United States Army truck negligently struck their car."7 One brother
was killed; the other brother and the father were injured seriously.48
37. 28 U.S.C. §2674.
38. Id. Therefore, a plaintiff only receives compensatory damages. The estimated past and
future veterans benefits are deducted from the award. Thus, if the award is less than the plain-
tiff's entitled veterans benefits, the award will be extinguished. See Brown v. United States,
348 U.S. 110, 111 (1954).





44. See generally Note, supra note 17, at 1099-1100.
45. 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
46. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 50 (1949).
47. Id. at 50.
48. Id.
1185
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 15
The Court refused to accept the contention that the FTCA excluded
all claims by service members. 9 Considering the FTCA exemptions
encompassing military combatant claims and claims arising in a foreign
country, the Court stated that to believe Congress did not have ser-
vice members in mind when the FTCA was passed was "absurd." ' 0
On this premise, the Court concluded that the Brooks' injuries had
no relation to their army careers since their injuries were not caused
by their service "except in the sense that all human events depend
upon what has already transpired." 5' The Court expressly stated,
however, that had the accident been incident to service, a wholly dif-
ferent case would have been presented.52
The Brooks Court reasoning was in line with the earlier Military
Claims Act of 1943. That Act allowed administrative settlement by
the War Department of claims not exceeding $1,000 for property losses,
personal injury, or death caused by military personnel and civilian
employees of the War Department, provided no contributory negligence
was involved and the injury was not sustained incident to service. 3
Claims of military personnel and civilian employees based on death
or injury incident to service were expressly excluded from the Act. 4
Thus, an "incident to service" bar to recovery was not a new idea.
A year after Brooks, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to deter-
mine the right of service members to sue the government when in-
juries were sustained incident to their service.
B. The Birth and Continuation of the Feres Doctrine
In 1950, the Supreme Court heard Feres v. United States" and two
companion cases56 that presented the common issue of whether ser-
vice members could sue for injuries sustained incident to service, which,
under other circumstances, would be an actionable wrong. 7 The Court
interpreted the FTCA to preclude claims arising from injuries sus-
tained incident to service.58 The Court apparently believed that by
49. Id. at 51.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 52.
52. Id.
53. See Note, Military Personnel and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 58 YALE L.J. 615,
621 (1949).
54. Id.
55. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
56. The companion cases were Griggs v. United States and Jefferson v. United States.
Id. at 137.
57. See id. at 138.
58. See id. at 146.
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being on leave, as the Brooks brothers were, military members removed
themselves from being incident to service. s9 The Feres court stated
"[t]he common fact underlying the three cases is that each claimant,
while on active duty and not on [leave], sustained injury due to
negligence of others in the armed forces." ' 60 (Emphasis added.)
Feres and its two companion cases were based upon injuries sus-
tained by three military members, who were on active-duty and not
on leave, due to alleged negligence of others in the armed forces.6'
In Feres, a widow sued the United States for the wrongful death of
her husband in a barracks fire.62 Similarly, in the companion case
of Griggs v. United States, a widow sued for the wrongful death of
her husband due to alleged medical malpractice.63 In the other com-
panion case, Jefferson v. United States, the plaintiff sued for injuries
resulting from medical malpractice."
The initial concern of the Court was the interpretation of the FTCA,
which if misconstrued by the Court, still could be remedied through
legislation by Congress, the "author of the confusion." 65 Having few
sources indicating congressional intent, the Court interpreted the FTCA
in light of the entire statutory system of remedies against the govern-
ment to make a workable, consistent, and equitable whole. 66 The Court
denied relief to the plaintiffs based on the following policy considera-
tions: (1) Congress did not intend to create new causes of action by
passage of the FTCA,61 (2) assimilation of the federal law into the
rules of state substantive law would create inequity by subjecting ser-
vice members to the laws of a location where they did not voluntar-
ily choose to reside, 68 (3) a distinctly federal relationship exists be-
59. See id.
60. Id. at 138.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 137.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 138-39.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 141. Moreover, the Court noted that the FTCA did not provide that all claims
be allowed, but rather intended acceptance of liability under circumstances that would implicate
private liability. The Court could find no American law that ever permitted a service member
to recover for injuries sustained through government negligence. Id. Furthermore, the Court
stated that since no private individual has power to mobilize an army, no analogous private
liability could be found. Id. at 141-42.
68. See id. at 142-43. Subsequent decisions have substantially weakened the persuasiveness
of this rationale. In Muniz v. United States, the Court noted that denial of any tort recovery
was far more prejudicial to a plaintiff than mere application of nonuniform state laws. Muniz
v. United States, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963).
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tween the government and members of the armed forces, 9 and (4)
veterans benefits for injury or death of the military member create
an alternative compensation system.70 Thus, the Feres doctrine was
created and has served as a bar to many service members' FTCA
claims during the past three decades. 7
Recently, the Supreme Court reviewed the first case since Feres in-
volving incident-to-service claims by active-duty military members."
Notwithstanding the harsh criticism of the Feres doctrine by legal com-
mentators and some members of the judiciary, 3 the Court reaffirmed
the Feres doctrine and restated the view that the doctrine seems best
supported by the unique relationship of service members to their
superiors, and the effects of suits on military discipline.74 The Court
stated that the military makes demands on service members that are
not encountered in civilian life. 71 For this reason, "civilian courts must,
69. Feres, 340 U.S. at 143-44; see also Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37
N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 187 (1962). "Courts are ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline
that any particular intrusion upon military authority might have." Id. In Stencel Aero Engineering
Corp. v. United States, the Court stated that the armed services perform a unique nationwide
function in protecting the security of the United States. "By their responsibilities, the military
authorities frequently move large numbers of people and large quantities of supplies from one
end of the continent to the other, and beyond, thus creating a significant risk of accidents
and injuries." Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 672 (1977).
Cf. Standard Oil v. United States, 332 U.S. 301, 305-10 (1947).
70. Feres, 340 U.S. at 145. The Court also stated that veterans benefits compare favorably
with those provided by most workers' compensation statutes. In Stencel, the Court referred
to the military compensation scheme as an "upper limit of liability for the Government as
to service-connected injuries." 431 U.S. at 673. See also Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Kopke,
Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 115 (1974). See generally Comment, Expansion of the Feres Doctrine, 32
EMORY L.J. 237, 238-47 (1983) (discussion of the development of the Feres doctrine).
71. The Feres doctrine, in its simplest form, is a judge-made exception for service members
who are injured. Jacoby, The Feres Doctrine, 24 HAsmos L.J. 1281, 1281 (1973). The Court
interpretation of the FTCA appears to have been mistaken. Representative Emmanuel Celler,
who drafted the FTCA and sponsored it through three sessions of Committee and House debate
to final passage, stated unequivocally when he learned of the Feres decision that he had never
intended to preclude a suit by a service member. Note, Military Personnel and the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 58 YmAE L.J. 615, 620-21 (1949). Some other Court decisions have also criticized
the manner in which the Feres doctrine was created. See Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. J.
G. Menihan Corp., 312 U.S. 81, 84 (1941). "Waivers by Congress of governmental immunity
from suit should be liberally construed in the case of federal instrumentalities-that being in
line with the current disfavor of the doctrine of government immunity." Rayonier, Inc. v.
United States, 352 U.S. 315, 320 (1956). "There is no justification for this Court to.read ex-
emptions into the [FTCA] beyond those provided by Congress." Id.
72. Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362 (1983).
73. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
74. 103 S. Ct. at 2365; see also Brown v. United States, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954); Muniz,
374 U.S. at 162; cf. Hall v. United States, 451 F.2d 353, 355 (1st Cir. 1971) (rejecting plain-
tiff's contention that the Feres doctrine is inapplicable in any case where no military discipline
was involved).
75. Chappell, 103 S. Ct. at 2365; see also United States Air Force Regulation 30-1 (1983)
(Air Force Standards).
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at the very least, hesitate long before entertaining a suit" that affects
the established relationship between military personnel.7 ' The Feres
doctrine, therefore, appears stable and not near judicial or legislative
abandonment. The doctrine, however, is applied inconsistently by the
courts because of the lack of Supreme Court guidance in determining
whether plaintiffs' injuries are incident to service." An examination
of lower court decisions reveals that cases are decided by various
methods, resulting in conflicting decisions. The situation is particularly
bad as the decisions differ not only between the federal circuits, but
also within the same circuit. 8
EXAMINATION OF THE PROBLEM
During the three decades since Feres was decided, courts have pro-
duced conflicting interpretations of Feres as applied to claims for tor-
tious injuries sustained by military members who are on active duty.79
The problem has centered on defining "incident to service" in the
context of whether the alleged injuries can be the subject of a FTCA
lawsuit as in Brooks, or whether the plaintiff is barred from court
as in Feres. Although some courts have argued that a clear and cer-
tain definition must be established to determine if a claim is barred, 0
other courts have argued that the facts of each case must be examined
because an inflexible test could produce greater inequities.81 Although
decisions interpreting Feres have reached widely varying results, courts
employ some or all of the following three factors in varying degrees
to determine whether a plaintiff's activities at the time of injury were
incident to service:82 (1) duty status of the plaintiff,83 (2) benefits
resulting from plaintiff's status as a service member,8 and (3) place
where the negligent act occurred.85 An examination of each factor
follows.
76. 103 S. Ct. at 2365. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Framers of the Constitution
anticipated this type of issue and explicitly granted Congress plenary authority to control the
military. Id. at 2365-66. See also U.S. CoNsT. art. I, cls. 12-14.
77. See infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
78. Compare Henninger v. United States, 473 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973) with Johnson v.
United States, 704 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1983).
79. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
80. See Henninger, 473 F.2d at 815-16.
81. See Johnson v. United States, 704 F.2d 1431, 1436 (9th Cir. 1983).
82. See id.
83. See id. at 1437-38.
84. See id. at 1438-39.
85. See id. at 1436-37.
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A. Duty Status of the Plaintiff
Typically, courts initially examine the duty status of the plaintiff
at the time the negligent act occurred.86 If an individual were on ac-
tive duty at the time of the negligent act, a cognizable claim cannot
be made.87 At the other extreme, a person who had been discharged
or retired from the military at the time of the incident in question
may be able to make a cognizable claim.8" Between these two ex-
tremes are the duty statuses of leave and off duty. 9 Whether valid
FTCA claims can be made for injuries sustained when a person is
on leave or off duty is uncertain. While some court decisions have
held that the victim's leave status is not dispositive of an incident
to service determination, 9 other courts have found leave status deter-
minative based upon Brooks.91 Several courts have recognized that
leave status does not alter an individual's active-duty status since the
service member remains subject to military control even on leave. 92
Likewise, courts have handled a service member's off-duty status in
various ways. Several courts have recognized that off-duty military
members are still on active duty and under military control.93 On the
other hand, other courts have treated off-duty military members as
civilians.9" The next factor a court considers is whether the plaintiff's
injury arose from a benefit the plaintiff would not have had but for
military status.
B. Benefits Resulting from Plaintiff's Status as a Service Member
As a benefit of military service, service members are entitled to
86. See infra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
87. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 143-46.
88. See Brown, 348 U.S. at 112-13; see also Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1013
(5th Cir. 1980).
89. A military member who is on leave is under less control of the military than one
who is off duty. The member who is on leave is excused from all military duties, while the
member who is off duty is simply enjoying nonduty hours and is more subject to recall. See
Zoula v. United States, 217 F.2d 81, 82 n.l (5th Cir. 1954).
90. See Camassar v. United States, 531 F.2d 1149, 1151 (2d Cir. 1976); Uptegrove v. United
States, 600 F.2d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 1979).
91. See Henninger, 473 F.2d at 815-16; Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138, 1140 (4th
Cir. 1975).
92. See Mills v. Tucker, 499 F.2d 866, 868 (9th Cir. 1974); Camassar, 531 F.2d at 1151 n.2.
93. See, e.g., Mariano v. United States, 444 F. Supp. 316, 317 (E.D. Va. 1977) holding
a service member's off-duty position as an employee of a naval station's noncommissioned
officers' club did not affect his duty status).
94. See, e.g., Johnson, 704 F.2d at 1439-40 (holding a service member's off-duty position
as an employee of a base noncommissioned officers' club placed him in the equivalent position
of a civilian).
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enjoy both recreational facilities" and veterans benefits. 96 Recreational
facilities vary among military installations, but often include a bowl-
ing alley, gymnasium, swimming pool, riding stable, and flying club. 97
These facilities are provided by the military to enhance the morale
and social well-being of active-duty military personnel.98 Veterans
benefits encompass a comprehensive disability and retirement system
for service members and a related system of benefits for service
members' dependents.99
Some courts have applied a rationale that prohibits recovery for
injuries that would not have been sustained "but for!' the recrea-
tional privileges associated with military service.' 00 This "but for"
test, for example, has been employed to bar recovery by a service
member who was injured while riding a horse rented from a stable
owned and operated by the Marine Corps.' Apparently, courts
developed the "but for" test in the belief that a suit based upon an
injury resulting from an activity provided by the military would af-
fect the military directly, and thus should not be allowed. 02 The same
analysis, however, is not employed to bar suits because of the availabil-
ity of veterans benefits as an administrative remedy.
Some confusion exists regarding whether the presence of an ad-
ministrative remedy precludes relief under the FTCA.' 13 An alternative
remedy seems to preclude the FTCA relief except when the alternative
source of compensation is veterans benefits.0 4 The availability of
veterans benefits has been used as a basis for strictly interpreting the
Feres doctrine,' although normally the benefits are only subtracted
from an FTCA court judgment. 1 6 Thus, although the existence of
95. See Rhodes, supra note 25, at 37.
96. See infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
97. See Rhodes, supra note 25, at 37.
98. Id.
99. See infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
100. See Hass, 518 F.2d at 1141-42; Chambers v. United States, 357 F.2d 224, 228-29 (8th
Cir. 1966).
101. Hass 518 F.2d 1138; cf. Hale v. United States, 416 F.2d 355, 358 (6th Cir. 1969).
102. See Johnson, 704 F.2d at 1438; Uptegrove, 600 F.2d at 1250.
103. Henninger, 473 F.2d at 816 n.2; see Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S. 427, 441
(1952). when "the Government has created a comprehensive system to award payments for
injuries, it should not be held to have made exceptions to that system without specific legisla-
tion to the effect." Id. See also infra notes 127-36 and accompanying text.
104. Id. Compare Denko v. United States, 385 U.S. 149, 151-54 (1966) (compensation system
provided in 18 U.S.C. § 4126 reasonably and fairly covers federal prisoners who are injured
in prison employment and is the exclusive remedy for that group) with Brown v. United States,
348 U.S. 110, 111 (1954) ("[t]he fact that compensation was sought and paid under the [Veterans
Benefits] Act [does not] bar recovery under the Tort Claims Act.").
105. See Henninger, 473 F. 2d at 816; Bailey v. Van Buskirk, 345 F.2d 298, 298 (9th Cir.
1965).
106. See Knecht v. United States, 242 F.2d 929, 931-32 (3d Cir. 1957).
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military recreational benefits may or may not serve as a bar to FTCA
claims by service members, the availability of veterans benefits at the
most will support a strict interpretation of Feres, and at the least,
will reduce a court award. The final factor a court may consider to
determine whether a plaintiff's activities at the time of injury were
incident to service is the place where the negligent act occurred.
C. Place Where the Negligent Act Occurred
The location of the negligent act is important in determining whether
injuries were sustained incident to service. Some courts have taken
the position that an injury to an active-duty military member sus-
tained on a military installation is an injury incident to service per
se.' °7 Other courts have held that the situs of the accident is not out-
come determinative.' 08 Brooks, however, supports the proposition that
if the service member is on leave and off base, the member can make
a cognizable FTCA claim.10 9 On the other hand, if the negligent act
occurs on base, the alleged injuries are more likely to be categorized
as incident to service." 0
Despite the inconsistent application of the three factors, most courts
agree the cases should be decided so that the principles underlying
the military disciplinary system are not upset. The goal of the court
is to determine if the claimant's FTCA lawsuit could harm the military
disciplinary system,"' which has recently been reaffirmed as the main
premise of the Feres doctrine." 2 Two distinct ways exist in which the
military disciplinary system could be affected by civil suits concern-
ing activities bearing a strong relationship to military affairs.' First,
military decision-makers subject to civil suit may be hesitant to act
as quickly and forcefully as necessary." ' Second, military members
may be encouraged to question orders from their superiors if they
are allowed to maintain suits against them or the government." I5 Prior
107. See Camassar, 531 F.2d at 1151. The presence of service members on base is directly
related to their military services. Id.
108. See Downes, 249 F. Supp. at 628-29; Parker, 611 F.2d at 1014. As in Downes, the
court believed that the critical factor was the nature of the function the service member was
performing at the time of the injury. Id.
109. See Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52.
110. See, e.g., Camassar, 531 F.2d at 1150-51.
111. See Downes, 249 F. Supp. at 628-29.
112. See Chappell, 103 S. Ct. at 2365.
113. Id.
114. See Jaffee, 663 F.2d at 1232; Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673.
115. See 663 F.2d at 1232. "The idea is that an undisciplined army is a mob and he who
is in it would weaken discipline if he can civilly litigate with others in the army over the perfor-
mance of another man's army duty." Bailey v. DeQuevedo, 375 F.2d 72, 74 (3d Cir. 1967).
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to an examination of possible solutions for curing the inconsistent
opinions dealing with FTCA claims of active-duty military members,
a discussion of other available remedies provides an understanding
of the reasons why service members continue to file FTCA claims.
EXISTING REMEDIES FOR INJURED SERVICE MEMBERS
Three sources will be examined briefly as alternative remedies to
the FTCA for injured service members. The three sources that will
be discussed are the Uniform Code of Military Justice (hereinafter
referred to as UCMJ),"1 6 the Military Claims Act (hereinafter refer-
red to as MCA)," 7 and the Veterans Benefits Act." ' This examina-
tion will reveal that service members rely upon the FTCA to equalize
their compensatory damages with those of similarly situated injured
civilians because the alternative sources provide only minimal
compensation.
Article 30 of the UCMJ allows any person subject to the UCMJ
to prefer charges against any other person subject to the UCMJ for
conduct amounting to a criminal violation." 9 Likewise, Article 138
of the UCMJ provides administrative review of service members' com-
plaints alleging that they have been wronged by their commanding
officer. '2 Articles 30 and 138, however, do not provide compensatory
relief for tortious wrongs committed by a service member.'1' Thus,
the articles do not offer a remedy for service members to redress tor-
tious injuries. Another possible remedial source is the Military Claims
Act.
The MCA provides a purely administrative remedy for certain types
of claims.' 22 No provision for an alternate lawsuit in federal district
court exists if the claim is disapproved.' 23 The MCA gives the
Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force authority to settle claims
of less than $25,000 against the United States.' 24 The MCA specifically
excludes claims for personal injuries of military members that are in-
116. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 127-38 and accompanying text.
119. 10 U.S.C. §830. For example, a service member can prefer criminal charges against
another service member for an alleged assault by the latter.
120. Id. §938; see Mollnow v. Carlton, 716 F.2d 627, 629 (9th Cir. 1983).
121. See 10 U.S.C. §§830, 938.
122. See id. §§2733, 2734.
123. See id. §2735.
124. See id. If the Secretary considers that a claim in excess of $25,000 is meritorious,
he may pay the claimant $25,000 and report the excess to Congress for its consideration. Id.
§2733(d).
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curred "incident to service""' or that could be the subject of an FTCA
claim. 26 Thus, the service member could not rely upon the MCA as
an alternative remedy for any potential FTCA claim. Military members
also can depend upon veterans benefits as a source of relief for their
injuries.
The Veterans Benefits Act provides a comprehensive disability and
retirement system for service members.' 27 The Act also establishes a
related system of benefits for service members' dependents. 28 Unlike
a typical workers' compensation statute, the Act does not mandate
exclusion of other remedies.' 29 Moreover, Congress did not provide
for an election of remedies in the Veterans Benefits Act. 30 Normally,
courts deduct the entitled amount of veterans benefits associated with
the plaintiff's injuries from the FTCA award by the court.',
The Supreme Court used the availability of veterans benefits to sup-
port the decision in Feres. The Court indicated that, as in workers'
compensation, the certain nature of the compensation under the
Veterans Benefits Act and the waiver of affirmative defenses outweigh
the bar to litigation.3 2 Furthermore, the Court concluded that the
plaintiffs' entitled veterans benefits compared extremely favorably with
the expected recoveries for their FTCA claims.' 33 Later, in Stencel
Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States," 4 the Supreme Court stated
that the Veterans Benefits Act serves the dual purpose of providing
a swift remedy for the injured service member while at the same time
providing an upper limit of liability for the government as to service-
connected injuries."'5 Apparently, therefore, the Court in Stencel did
not intend to imply that nonservice-connected injuries are precluded
by the availability of veterans benefits.136
An FTCA lawsuit would not be a viable remedy for service members
who are not seriously injured, since the court award in the lawsuit
will be reduced by the amount of past and expected future veterans
125. Id. §2733(b)(3).
126. id. §2733(b)(2).
127. 38 U.S.C. §§301-362, 401-423, 501-562, 601-654, 701-788.
128. Id.
129. Compare id. with 33 U.S.C. § 905. See generally Note, supra note 17, at 1106-09
(comparison of veterans benefits with workers' compensation).
130. See 38 U.S.C. §§301-362, 401-423, 501-562, 601-654, 701-788.
131. See Brown, 348 U.S. at 111.
132. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 144-45.
133. Id. at 145. The Court spoke of plaintiffs' expected veterans benefits to illustrate that
the compensation system of veterans benefits were not negligible and compared favorably with
most workers' compensation statutes. See id.
134. Stencel, 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
135. Id.-at 673.
136. See id.; see also 340 U.S. at 144-45.
1194
1984 / Solving the Feres Puzzle
benefits associated with the alleged injury.'3 7 Thus, even if a service
member can hurdle the "incident to service" obstacle, a claim for
a minor injury can be obliterated by the plaintiff's entitled veterans
benefits. Seriously injured or disabled service members, who would
not be compensated as well by veterans benefits as their civilian
counterparts who are awarded recovery in- civil suits thus turn to the
FTCA as an equalizing remedy. 33 The failure of the UCMJ, MCA,
and Veterans Benefits Act to compensate tortiously injured military
members, therefore, forces military members to seek redress under the
FTCA. Military members then must confront the problem of judicial
inconsistency in handling service member FTCA claims.
STABILIZING FTCA INTERPRETATIONS: AN ANALYTICAL FRAmEwoRK
TO DEFINE "INCIDENT TO SERVICE"
Many commentators have criticized the Feres doctrine, either urg-
ing abolition 39 or modification. 4 " Regardless of the persuasive
arguments for either termination or revision of the Feres doctrine,
the Feres doctrine does not appear to be in danger of extinction.' 4'
In Chappell v. Wallace, the Court affirmed the position that Con-
gress has plenary authority in this area, and that if the Feres doctrine
is to be modified, Congress must take the initiative.'42 If the Feres
doctrine is firmly established, courts should strive to apply the doc-
trine consistently to enable plaintiffs to predict the viability of their
claims, and more importantly, to ensure equity. If a consistent
analytical framework is not achieved, decisions will continue to lack
uniformity. Courts can achieve consistent results in deciding service
member FTCA claims only if a uniform test is developed to deter-
mine whether a plaintiff's injuries were sustained incident to service.
An analytical definition for "incident to service" must be developed
and adopted by the courts.
One logical solution is to analogize the definition of incident to
service in FTCA claims to the definitional analysis used to determine
that a military court-martial has jurisdiction over a military member
charged with a crime. In both situations, civilian courts must deter-
137. See Brown, 348 U.S. at 111.
138. See Rhodes, supra note 25, at 41.
139. See, e.g., Note, supra note 17, at 1126.
140. See, e.g., Donaldson, Constitutional Torts and Military Effectiveness: A Proposed Alter-
native to the Feres Doctrine, 23 A.F. L. REv. 171, 205-07 (1983) (suggesting the elimination
of the Military Claims Act "incident to service" bar to recovery).
141. See Chappell, 103 S. Ct. at 2364-65.
142. Id.
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mine whether they should exercise jurisdiction over a matter that af-
fects the military. This determination is made in light of the United
States Supreme Court philosophy that civilian courts, if possible, should
avoid handling cases that affect the military disciplinary system.'
43
Courts employ a multifactor test to determine if a military member
should be tried in a civilian court or by the military in a
court-martial.' 4 Likewise, the civil courts could use a multifactor test
to determine if a service member's FTCA claim should be barred
because the alleged injuries have been sustained incident to service. 41
Although the test would be discretionary with the trial court, plain-
tiffs would know the factors that courts will consider in determining
the viability of their FTCA lawsuits. Although the incident to service
test requires a case-by-case analysis that will need several years to
produce consistent decisions, this result would be preferable to the
current inconsistent decisions found even within a circuit.' 46 A con-
sistent analytical framework also will reduce the large number of FTCA
lawsuits because plaintiffs will be in a position to predict the viability
of their claims more accurately.
The factors would be examined in the overall context of the premise
of the Feres doctrine: the preservation of the unique requirements
of the military disciplinary system. 47 The factors would be considered
in determining the nature of the plaintiff's activity at the time of
the negligent act.' 8 In other words, the court would determine if the
plaintiff's activities at the time of the negligent act were of the sort
that would implicate the interest that the Feres doctrine was designed
to protect. '4
A court should consider three factors in determining whether a plain-
tiff's complaint implicates the interest that the Feres doctrine was
designed to protect. The three factors that indicate if the alleged in-
143. See id. at 2365.
144. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969); Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S.
355 (1971). See generally Nelson and Westbrook, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Servicemen
for "Civilian" Offenses: An Analysis of O'Callahan v. Parker, 54 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1969).
145. See generally Note, In Support of the Feres Doctrine and a Better Definition of "Inci-
dent to Service," 56 ST. JoHm's L. REv. 485, 512-14 (1982); Johnson, 704 F.2d at 1436-41.
146. Compare Henninger, 473 F.2d at 816 ("[T]he drawing of a clear line is more impor-
tant than being able to justify, in every conceivable case, the exact point at which it is drawn.")
with Johnson, 704 F.2d at 1436 ("While rigid rules . . .may sometimes be relevant, they
cannot be blindly applied to determine whether an injury occurred 'in the course of activity
incident to service."').
147. See Brown, 348 U.S. at 112.
148. See Johnson, 704 F.2d at 1436.
149. See id.; Woodside v. United States, 606 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1979). To prevent
meaningless appeals, appellate courts should only reverse a district court determination if an
abuse of discretion is found. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
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juries were sustained incident to service, in order of importance, are
as follows: (1) whether the plaintiff's injuries were sustained from
a benefit that was available solely from the plaintiff's military service,"'0
(2) whether the plaintiff was on leave at the time of the negligent
act or omission,' 5 ' and (3) whether the negligent act occurred on or
off base.' 52 After examining these factors, the court must determine
if the circumstances indicate a need to bar the FTCA claim to pro-
tect the military disciplinary system. 153
Whether the plaintiff's injuries were sustained from a benefit that
was available solely because of the plaintiff's military status is the
most obvious factor to be used to determine if the alleged injuries
were sustained incident to service. If the injuries resulted from a recrea-
tional or medical benefit to which the plaintiff would not have had
access but for military status, allowing an FTCA claim would affect
the military directly.' 54 Military benefits and recreational activities are
provided for the morale and health of military personnel, and thus
serve the overall military purpose. 55 If an FTCA claim were allowed,
the military may be tempted to eliminate recreational benefits, thus
affecting military health and welfare, which would cause a weaken-
ing of the disciplinary system.
The second factor, the plaintiff's duty status, indicates the strength
of the nexus between the military member and the military. The closer
the nexus, the more willing a court should be to bar the plaintiff's
lawsuit. An active-duty service member can be on duty, off duty,
or on leave. If the service member were on duty, the injuries most
likely would be sustained incident to service. Since on-duty service
members are acting within the military disciplinary system, that is,
acting under direct orders from superiors, most of their FTCA claims
would implicate the policy underlying Feres.156 The other duty statuses,
off duty and on leave, unfortunately have been blurred or ignored
by the courts. ' "Off duty" simply means that military members are
not performing their duties during their established work hours.151
150. See 704 F.2d at 1438-39.
151. See id. at 1437-38.
152. See id. at 1436-37.
153. See Chappell, 103 S. Ct. at 2365.
154. See, e.g., Hass, 518 F.2d at 1138.
155. See id. 1141-42.
156. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., 704 F.2d at 1438. The Supreme Court ignored the fact that a military member
who is on leave can still be injured such that the injuries would be classified as incident to
service, thereby justifying a denial of an FTCA claim. See 340 U.S. at 138.
158. See Zoula, 217 F. 2d at 82 n.1.
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On the other hand, service members on leave are on vacation and
are excused from work, and are thereby further removed from military
duty than off-duty service members.'59
Courts must recognize that an off-duty service member is not in
the same status category as one who is on leave. Although both
categories are still active duty, the service member who is on leave
is less closely connected with military control than the service member
who is off duty. The service member who was on leave at the time
of the negligent act can make a stronger argument that the injuries
were not connected with military duties or responsibilities, were not
incident to service, and thus would not affect the military disciplinary
system.
The third factor, the location of the negligent act, will not be as
indicative of a service connection as the other two factors. Although
the negligence may have occurred on base, the injured service member
may have a legitimate FTCA claim if the member was performing
purely personal activity while off duty.16 The court should explore
the nature of the service member's activity thoroughly.' 61 If the
negligent act occurred on base, the court must scrutinize the cir-
cumstances closely to insure the FTCA claim will not affect the military
disciplinary system that the Feres doctrine was designed to protect.
To prevent a flood of FTCA claims, the court should continue to
place the burden on the plaintiff to establish the right to sue under
the FTCA. The plaintiff would have to make a prima facie showing
that the circumstances, considered with three factors, indicate the in-
juries were not incident to service. All three factors must be con-
sidered together when determining if a service member's FTCA claim
should be allowed on the basis that the military disciplinary system
will not be affected. Two hypothetical fact patterns can be used to
illustrate the suggested analytical framework.
Situation A: Lieutenant (Lt.) Adams, while on leave, was struck
by a military truck driven negligently by a civilian employed by the
military. The accident occurred on base as Lt. Adams was bicycling
on her own bicycle to her on-base quarters. Lt. Adams' activity of
riding her bicycle was not related to her military duties in any way.
The government can argue that, but for the fact that Lt. Adams was
entitled to military leave, which was approved by her supervisor, and
but for the fact that by being in the military, Lt. Adams was able
159. Id.
160. See Parker, 611 F.2d at 1014.
161. Id.; see also 704 F.2d at 1437.
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to live on base, the accident would not have happened. The activity
of riding a bicycle for personal pleasure not connected with military
duties, however, cannot be categorized as a benefit available solely
from Adams' military status.' 2 A court cannot state that but for the
individual's military service, the injury would not have occurred.' 63
Lt. Adams was on leave, and thus was removed as much as possi-
ble from military control.' 64 Assuming Adams was not involved in
any activity relating to her military duties, the injuries should not
be described as incident to service.'6 5 Although the on-base situs of
the negligent act warrants a close examination of the facts to ensure
that Adams was not engaging in activities incident to her military
duties, the consideration of the other two factors has shown that
Adams' activities were not connected with her military
responsibilities.' 66 Thus, allowing Lt. Adams to bring her claim would
not affect military discipline at all.
As in Brooks,167 Adams' accident had nothing to do with her military
career; her injuries were not caused by her military service "except
in the sense that all human events depend upon what has already
transpired." '68 Allowing Adams to file a lawsuit would not affect her
relationship with her superiors. The policy considerations underlying
Feres are avoided. Furthermore, any award by the court would be
reduced by the amount of veterans benefits Adams received or is ex-
pected to receive in the future.' 69 In this manner, Lt. Adams would
not realize a windfall, but would be compensated to the extent of
a similarly situated civilian. By allowing Adams to fle an FTCA lawsuit,
therefore, the court would be placing her in the equivalent position
of a civilian similarly injured. 70
Situation B: Sergeant (Sgt.) Baker worked at the base Noncommis-
sioned Officers' (NCO) Club during his off-duty hours. Although state
law required all bars serving alcohol to close at midnight, the NCO
Club manager, also an off-duty military member, allowed a group
of military members to have an after-hours squadron party until 2:00
162. See Downes, 249 F. Supp. at 626.
163. 611 F.2d at 1011.
164. See Zoula, 217 F.2d at 82 n.l.
165. See Camassar, 531 F.2d at 1151.
166. See Stanley v. Central Intelligence Agency, 639 F.2d 1146, 1151 (5th Cir. 1981).
167. Brooks, 337 U.S. 49.
168. Id. at 52.
169. See Brown, 348 U.S. at 111.
170. But see Coffey v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 1087, 1088 (S.D. Cal. 1971) (no recovery
for on-base accident even though plaintiff was on leave and driving towards exit gate); Gursley
v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 614 (D. Colo. 1964) (no recovery for service member while
on three day pass when explosion destroyed his on-base quarters).
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a.m. '7 Sgt. Baker's NCO Club duties ended at midnight, but he at-
tended the promotion party for his squadron co-workers. While Sgt.
Baker was being driven home by a squadron member, the car left
the road because the driver was intoxicated. Sgt. Baker was injured
seriously in the accident, which occurred on base.
Sgt. Baker held a nonappropriated funds position at the NCO Club.
Baker was not given hiring preference based on his military status,
but was required to receive his military commander's permission to
apply for the position.'72 Baker's NCO Club position was controlled
by military regulation,' which denied him the NCO Club civilian
employees' privilege of workers' compensation. 74 Baker's position was
not obtained but for his military status since he was not given
preference over civilian applicants.
The activity of enjoying NCO Club privileges after working hours,
however, did result from Baker's military status. 7 The club was owned
and operated by the military for the morale and social well-being of
active-duty military personnel.' 7 6 Moreover, Baker's attendance at the
party could be attributed to his assignment to the military squadron
rather than his NCO Club position, especially since the duties
associated with the NCO Club had ended. Although Baker could argue
that his attendance was a result of his club responsibilities, the court
would have to consider that Baker's salary as a club employee was
derived from congressional military appropriations and nonappropriated
funds generated by military recreational activities.' 77 On this basis,
the court would be justified in considering the club position to be
connected with the military directly, particularly for an off-duty ser-
vice member.
Baker's off-duty status does not withdraw him from military con-
trol. Baker could have been recalled to his military duties at any time.
Moreover, Baker's club position was controlled by military regula-
tion. Furthermore, Baker was not acting in his capacity as an NCO
171. Military clubs located on military installations are not required to comply with state
alcohol regulations and statutes. See 10 U.S.C. §2682. See also id. §2683.
172. See United States Air Force Regulation 40-7 (1983).
173. Id.
174. Id. 40-7c; see Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin v. Arien,
244 F. Supp. 110, 114 (N.D. NY 1965). An active-duty service member who was injured as
a result of the explosion of a beer bottle while working in civilian clothes at an Air Force
base tavern was not a "civilian employee" within Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentality Act
provision making Longshormen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act applicable with respect
to disability occurring to civilian employees of any nonappropriated fund instrumentality. Id.
175. See Mariano, 444 F. Supp. at 317.
176. See Rhodes, supra note 25, at 37.
177. 444 F. Supp. at 318.
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Club employee at the time of the injury. Although the on-base acci-
dent situs indicates a closer nexus to the military, careful scrutiny
of the facts is required to determine if the plaintiff's claim should
be barred.
If the lawsuit were allowed, the military system of discipline would
be affected adversely. Baker was under military control at his club
position and was enjoying a benefit derived from his military status.
Baker should not be allowed to maintain an FTCA lawsuit. Baker will
receive veterans benefits, including medical treatment. Any court award
would weaken the military disciplinary structure by affecting Baker's
relationship with his superiors.' 78
Although under the multifactor test applied in the preceding two
hypotheticals, each case must be analyzed individually according to
the facts and circumstances, a consistent application of three fac-
tors will produce more consistent court decisions regarding service
members' FTCA lawsuits. As previously stated, the number of FTCA
claims may decrease as plaintiffs will be able to predict the viability
of their claims more accurately. In this manner, the Feres doctrine
will serve the purpose of barring only those lawsuits that will affect
the military adversely.
CONCLUSION
The Feres doctrine has been a bar to the FTCA claims of service
members for thirty years. Although many legal commentators and
judges have criticized the doctrine throughout the past three decades,
Feres has not been weakened. In Feres v. United States, the Supreme
Court advised Congress to enact legislation overturning the doctrine
if the Court had misconstrued the FTCA. Congress has not accepted
that offer.
The Feres doctrine survived for good reason. The backbone of the
military is the disciplinary system that produces a unique relationship
among military members. The military disciplinary system would be
undermined if active-duty service members could sue under the FTCA
for injuries connected with their military service. Congress has real-
ized this and has not taken action to alter the Feres doctrine. The
judiciary should accept the fact that the Feres doctrine will not
disappear.
A uniform framework for analyzing cases must be designed,
however, so that courts can determine if the plaintiff's injuries were
178. Compare Mariano, 444 F. Supp. 316 with Johnson, 704 F.2d 1431.
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sustained incident to service, thereby implicating the policy considera-
tions underlying Feres. The policy considerations underlying Feres in-
clude the following: (1) Congress did not intend to create new causes
of action; (2) assimilation of the federal law into the rules of state
substantive law, among which divergencies are notorious, would force
service members to face inequity by being subject to the laws of a
location where they did not choose to reside voluntarily; (3) a distinctly
federal relationship exists between the government and members of
its armed forces; and (4) the military member's veterans benefits for
injury or death create an alternative compensation system. Modernly,
the main premise upon which the Feres doctrine is justified is the
potentially destructive effect upon the military disciplinary system that
would result by allowing military members to sue the government for
injuries sustained incident to service.
The courts have not developed a consistent analytical framework
to determine whether the plaintiff's alleged injuries were sustained
incident to service. As a result, courts use various methods to resolve
whether the military member should be allowed to maintain an FTCA
lawsuit against the government. Moreover, the court decisions lack
uniformity.
A uniform analytical framework should be employed to determine
if the plaintiff's injuries were sustained incident to service. The courts
should consider (1) the activity in which the plaintiff was engaged
at the time of injury, (2) the plaintiff's duty status, and (3) the place
where the plaintiff was injured. Each case will require an individual
analysis to determine whether the facts implicate the policy considera-
tions underlying Feres. The framework, however, undoubtedly will
provide more consistency than has existed since Feres was decided.
In this manner, plaintiffs can be assured equal access to the courts
and the Feres doctrine will be used for the purposes intended by
Congress.
Michael Gilbert
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